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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays on modeling the behavior of both fiscal and 
monetary policy by allowing for asymmetry in preferences of the policy authorities. Whether the 
responses of fiscal or monetary policy to the business cycle conditions are symmetric or 
asymmetric is still an unresolved question. The idea behind asymmetric behavior is that policy 
makers take stronger action during times of distress than during ordinary times. The following 
chapters investigate this question empirically using data for the United States and show that 
policy makers do behave asymmetrically.   
Chapter 1 investigates whether the asymmetric monetary policy preferences for the 
output gap as shown in Surico (2007) disappeared during the post-Volcker period spanning 
1982:04- 2003:02. The results show Surico’s conclusion to be fragile as moving the starting 
period for the estimation a few quarters forward shows strong asymmetric policy behavior.  
Chapter 2 investigates U.S. fiscal policy sustainability and cyclicality in empirical 
structures that allow fiscal policy responses to exhibit asymmetric behavior. Two quarterly 
intervals of data are investigated, both of which begin in 1955. The short sample was chosen for 
comparison to Bohn (1998), while the full sample uses all available data. The results for a short 
sample that ends in the second quarter of 1995 show some differences from the results for the 
full sample that includes the financial crisis and the Great Recession. For the full sample, U.S. 
fiscal policy is asymmetrical in regard to both sustainability and cyclicality. Regarding fiscal 
policy sustainability, the best fitting models show evidence of fiscal policy sustainability for the 
short sample. However, the fiscal sustainability question does become less clear for the full 
sample. Regarding fiscal policy cyclicality, we find during times of distress, policy is strongly 
countercyclical, but during good times the results are mixed. 
Chapter 3 investigates the source of asymmetry in reaction of U.S. fiscal policy to 
business cycle conditions, as shown in chapter 2. By decomposing the fiscal policy variable into 
the tax revenues and the expenditures, we show that both series exhibit asymmetry in a way 
which is analogous to the results found in chapter 2.  
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1 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Did Asymmetric Monetary Preferences for the Output 
Gap Disappear During Recent Economic Times?
1
 
1.1 Introduction 
Beginning with Barro and Gordon (1983), there has been considerable work that has 
investigated monetary policy as being carried out within the context of an optimal planning 
structure. Recent variations of these models that have attracted considerable attention are 
structures in which the planner has asymmetric preferences over one or more economic targets. 
Such models have been described and empirically investigated by Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004), 
Nobay and Peel (2003), Surico (2007) and Cassou, Scott and Vázquez (2012) among others. The 
empirical results have been mostly favorable to the asymmetric preference structure, however, in 
Surico (2007), results were somewhat mixed.  In particular, he did not find evidence in the more 
recent economic period of asymmetric preferences for the output gap, despite finding evidence in 
favor of it during an earlier period.  In this paper we show that the results for the recent data are 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is the extended version of the paper titled “Did Asymmetric Monetary Preferences for the Output Gap 
Disappear During Recent Economic Times?” written with Dr. Steven Cassou and Dr. Jesus Vázquez, and has been 
published in Applied Economics Letters in 2014.  
2 
sensitive to the dates at which the empirical investigation is carried out.  Using data that begins 
just a few quarters later, we show that the evidence for asymmetric preferences over the output 
gap becomes strong. 
To some extent our investigation is motivated by a broader question about whether using 
the statutory end to the Volcker experiment of 1982:4, which Surico (2007) used, is the 
appropriate date at which to set as the initial date for investigating modern monetary policy.  
Alternatively one might consider the Great Moderation period as in the influential paper of 
Smets and Wouters (2007).  Stock and Watson (2002) suggest that the onset of the Great 
Moderation occurred somewhere between 1982:4 and 1985:3 with a midpoint of 1984:1.  Galí 
and Gambetti (2009), Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000) and Smets 
and Wouters (2007) also mark 1984:1 as the onset of the Great Moderation. We conduct a 
sensitivity analysis by rerunning the empirical equation in Surico (2007) and incrementally 
moving the starting date for the estimation one period forward.  We find that by considering a 
sample period starting in 1984:1, a significant coefficient for the output gap reappears and 
remains for all further starting period increments.  This result is robust to different endpoints, 
including the one Surico (2007) used of 2003:2 as well as 2007:4 which is the period just before 
the onset of the financial crisis in the U.S.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model with 
asymmetric preferences as developed by Surico (2007). Section 2.3 discusses the empirical 
findings. Finally, Section 1.4 concludes. 
 
3 
1.2 Empirical Equations 
This section describes the theoretical optimal monetary planner model as described in 
Surrico (2007) that incorporates asymmetric preferences. The evolution of the economy is 
represented by the following two-equation system.  
 
t  kYt  Yt  f t,   #    (1.1) 
 
 
Yt  Yt  it  Ett1  gt,   #    (1.2) 
where t  is inflation, )(  tt YY  is output gap, and )( 1 ttt Ei   denotes the real interest rate. The 
error terms stttt Ef   1  and 
d
ttttt YYEg 

 )( 11  are taken as given reflecting the fact 
that the monetary authorities cannot directly control expectations, and st  and 
d
t  are cost and 
demand disturbances that obey an autoregressive, mean reverting process. 
The central bank problem is to choose the interest rate at the beginning of period t 
conditional upon the information available at the end of the previous period, so as to solve  
 
min
i t
E t1
1
2
expt    t     1
 
2
expYt  Yt  Yt  Yt  1
 
2
it  i2
.   #   
 
(1.3) 
This objective function incorporates asymmetric preferences. The coefficient   and   represent 
the central bank's aversion towards output and interest rate fluctuations around their targets, 
while   and   capture any asymmetry in the objective function of the monetary policy makers. 
This asymmetric loss function nests the quadratic loss function, which is consistent with 
4 
symmetric preferences, as a special case when 0  . A negative value of   implies that, 
everything else equal, an output contraction relative to the potential level is weighted more 
severely than an output expansion.  A similar interpretation is true for  . That is, a positive 
value of   implies that monetary authorities are more concerned when inflation is higher than 
the target than when it is lower than the target. 
Substituting (1.1) and (1.2)in to the objective function (1.3), we get 
min
i t
E t1
1
2
expkYt  Yt  f t    kYt  Yt  f t     1
 
2
expYt  Yt  Yt  Yt  1
 
2
it  i2
.
 
Taking the derivative, we can write the first order condition as, 
 
E t1
k

expkit  E tt1  gt  f t    1
  expit  E tt1  gt  1
it  i
 0.
 
(1.4) 
Using (1.1) and (1.2), we get  
 
E t1
k

expt    1
  expYt  Yt
  1  it  i
 0.
 
(1.5) 
Next, evaluating expectations, we get 
 
E t1 
k

expt    1
E t1 

 expYt  Yt
  1  it  i  0
  #   
 
(1.6) 
 
5 
Using Taylor Series Expansion, we can simplify the exponential parts, to get 
 
expYt  Yt   1  Yt  Yt  
Yt  Yt 2
2

Yt  Yt 3
6

Yt  Yt 4
24
. . . .
  #   
 
(1.7) 
and 
 
expt    1  t   
t  2
2

t  3
6

t  4
24
. . . .
  #   
 
(1.8) 
Substitutes (1.7) and (1.8) into (1.6), we get 
 
E t1 
k
 t  
  t
2
2
E t1 

 Yt  Yt
   Y tY t
2
2
it  i  0
.   #   
 
(1.9) 
 
Following a few more simplifying steps, eventually we get the linear regression  
 
it  i 
k
 
 
k
2
2 
k
 E t1t

k
2
E t1t2 
k
 
E t1t


 E t1Yt  Yt
  

2
E t1Yt  Yt2 ,
 
(1.10) 
 
 
6 
Further simplification implies the regression equation in terms of the original parameters of  
 
it  i 
k
 
 
k
2
2

k
 E t1t 
k
2
E t1t2 
k
 
E t1t


 E t1Yt  Yt
  

2
E t1Yt  Yt2 .
  #   
 
(1.11) 
We replace expectations with realized values and, in line with most empirical studies on 
monetary policy rules, we introduce a lagged dependent variable capturing interest rate 
smoothing. Adding these changes, we can rewrite (1.11)  
 
it  c0  c1t  c2Yt  Yt  c3t2  c4Yt  Yt2  it1  t.   #    (1.12) 
where   2
20
)(    


 kkic ,     kkc1 , 2c ,  23 kc  ,  24 c , and tv  is 
an independent, zero mean error term. 
The key parameters which indicate asymmetric monetary policy preferences are 3c  and 
4c . Standard theoretical interpretations for asymmetric preferences over inflation and output 
imply that 3c  should be positive while 4c  should be negative. In particular, a positive 3c  
corresponds to a positive   which shows asymmetric preferences for inflation. That is, positive 
deviations in inflation create more loss than negative ones. Similarly, it could be shown that, a 
negative 4c  corresponds to a negative   which shows asymmetric preferences for the output 
gap. That is, negative deviations of output from potential output create more loss than positive 
ones. Finally, 043  cc  corresponds to 0   which shows symmetric preferences.  
 
 
7 
1.3 Sub-Period Empirical Results 
Surrico (2007) estimates (1.12) using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
data bank. In estimating this equation, the interest rate chosen by policy makers is the Federal 
Funds rate and the output gap is computed by subtracting potential GDP from observed GDP.  
Two measures for the inflation rate were used.  One computes inflation from the personal 
consumption expenditure index (PCE index) and the other computes inflation from the GDP 
deflator. 
Although Surico (2007) never finds 3c  to be significant, what has drawn greater attention 
is the finding that 4c  is significantly negative during the pre-Volcker period spanning 1960:1-
1979:3, but is insignificant during the post-Volcker period spanning 1982:4-2003:2.
2
 This has 
been interpreted as implying that monetary policy maker preferences have changed between 
these two periods from one which weighs output below potential output as more concerning 
during the pre-Volcker period to one in which positive and negative deviations for potential 
output are equally weighted. 
To investigate this finding we began by replicating the original findings in Surico (2007). 
Table 1.1 summarizes Surico's original parameter estimates over the two sample periods for 
regressions using two alternative measures for inflation as well as our results over these two 
periods and an extension of the post Volcker period to run up until the onset of the U.S. financial 
crisis beginning in 2008:01.
3
 Our regressions use the same Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation procedure with 13 instruments, which implies 7 over identifying restrictions. 
                                                 
2
 To be consistent with Surico, we used the term “Pre-Volcker period” to refer to the period before Volcker 
experiment, and the term “Post-Volcker period” for the period after Volcker experiment of 1982:4.  Although these 
terms may invoke some confusion, we thought that it would be useful to keep the terminology the same as Surico.  
3
 Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 present only a subset of the empirical output.  So here, we leave out the values for c₀ and 
ρ.  
8 
The instruments include two lags of inflation, squared inflation, output gap, squared output gap, 
the Federal Funds rate and the alternative measure of inflation.  Although we were unable to get 
exactly the same numbers, our results confirm Surico's results, particularly for the 4c  estimates 
which are the focus of this essay.  We attribute the inability to precisely match Surico's numbers 
as arising from periodic data revisions which the data undergo as statistical tabulation authorities 
periodically reevaluate the calculations.
4
 
 
Table 1.1: Surico Results and Replication 
  Sample Period 
  1960:1-1979:3  1982:4-2003:2  1982:4-2007:4 
  Surico Replication  Surico Replication  Extension 
 c₁ 0.33** 0.344**  0.89** 0.603*  0.696* 
  (0.12) (0.129)  (0.36) (0.304)  (0.320) 
PCE c₂ 0.25** 0.259**  0.17** 0.123**  0.132** 
  (0.04) (0.049)  (0.04) (0.037)  (0.031) 
Inf c₃ -0.01 0.004  -0.11 -0.085  -0.103 
  (0.01) (0.017)  (0.06) (0.059)  (0.063) 
 c₄ -0.04** -0.030**  -0.01 0.006  0.008 
  (0.01) (0.010)  (0.01) (0.007)  (0.007) 
         
 c₁ 0.17** 0.267*  2.23 0.688  0.680 
  (0.12) (0.129)  (1.17) (0.450)  (0.462) 
GDP c₂ 0.18** 0.239**  0.09 0.105*  0.123** 
  (0.03) (0.056)  (0.09) (0.043)  (0.035) 
Inf c₃ 0.01 0.006  -0.41 -0.121  -0.111 
  (0.01) (0.018)  (0.25) (0.091)  (0.092) 
 c₄ -0.03** -0.032**  -0.02 0.008  0.009 
  (0.01) (0.012)  (0.02) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, while two 
asterisks indicate significant at the 5% level. 
 
                                                 
4
 To be more precise, our data set is likely to differ from the one used by Surico (2007) since our data are thoroughly 
revised data whereas roughly one seventh of the last observations of inflation considered by Surico (2007), 
presumably collected around the third quarter of 2003, were not revised data at the time they were collected because 
National Income and Product Accounts variables take approximately three years to be fully revised (see Aruoba, 
2008, and Croushore, 2011, for details on data revisions). Our revised output gap time series and the one used by 
Surico (2007) are also different because the output gap revisions are sizable as documented by Croushore (2011) and 
references therein. 
9 
In Table 1.2 we summarize the results of an empirical analysis that broadens the 
interpretation of the post-Volcker period.  The table has two panels, with the upper panel 
focusing on the same end date as Surico's analysis of 2003:2 while the second panel focuses on 
the extended sample which has an end date of 2007:4. Next, we reran the basic regressions but 
incrementally started the sample period one quarter later. As Table 1.2 indicates, for both 
measures of inflation, as well as both sample endpoints, the c₄ parameter became significant 
when the start period began in 1984:1 and remained significant for all further increments to the 
starting period.  Interestingly, 1984:1 is the quarter that Stock and Watson (2002) estimated to 
mark as the beginning of the Great Moderation. Moreover, the size of the parameter estimate 4c  
and its associated standard error for the full sample period (1984:1-2007:4) are similar to those 
found for the pre-Volcker period as shown in Table 1.1. What these results show is that the 
finding that asymmetric monetary preferences for output gap being insignificant during recent 
economic times is fragile, and that using data intervals which begin somewhat later than the date 
of 1982:4 used by Surico (2007) shows that monetary authorities consistently exhibited 
asymmetric preferences during both the pre-Volcker and the post-Volcker periods. 
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Table 1.2: Variations on the Second Interval Sample Period 
  Results for start period given and ending in 2003:2 
  Surico 1982:4 1983:1 1983:2 1983:3 1983:4 1984:1 1984:2 1984:3 1984:4 
 
c₁ 0.89** 0.603* 0.523 0.408 0.350 0.714* 0.930** 1.005** 1.024** 0.976** 
  (0.36) (0.304) (0.300) (0.301) (0.307) (0.311) (0.308) (0.296) (0.281) (0.259) 
PCE c₂ 0.17** 0.123** 0.115** 0.099** 0.095** 0.139** 0.174** 0.190** 0.194** 0.193** 
  (0.04) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.033) 
Inf c₃ -0.11 -0.085 -0.069 -0.049 -0.034 -0.093 -0.122* -0.129* -0.131** -0.119** 
  (0.06) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) (0.055) (0.052) (0.048) (0.044) 
 c₄ -0.01 0.006 -0.009 0.016* 0.007 -0.035 -0.056** -0.066** -0.066** -0.065** 
  (0.01) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
c₁ 2.23 0.688 0.608 0.399 0.300 0.692 0.951* 1.048* 1.183** 1.192** 
  (1.17) (0.450) (0.432) (0.444) (0.465) (0.471) (0.480) (0.468) (0.450) (0.399) 
GDP c₂ 0.09 0.105** 0.096* 0.080** 0.072 0.110* 0.148** 0.172^** 0.180** 0.180** 
  (0.09) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.040) 
Inf c₃ -0.41 -0.121 -0.104 -0.059 -0.037 -0.103 -0.137 -0.148 -0.174* -0.174* 
  (0.25) (0.091) (0.089) (0.091) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.090) (0.086) (0.075) 
 c₄ -0.02 0.008 -0.010 0.014 0.012 -0.024 -0.048** -0.060** -0.060** -0.061** 
  (0.02) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
  Results for start period given and ending in 2007:4 
  Surico 1982:4 1983:1 1983:2 1983:3 1983:4 1984:1 1984:2 1984:3 1984:4 
 
c₁ 0.89** 0.696** 0.610 0.496 0.438 0.681* 0.746** 0.781** 0.779** 0.727** 
  (0.36)    (0.320) (0.321) (0.324) (0.321) (0.301) (0.288) (0.276) (0.261) (0.243) 
PCE c₂ 0.17** 0.132** 0.127** 0.119** 0.113** 0.127** 0.135** 0.142** 0.143** 0.143** 
  (0.04) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) 
Inf c₃ -0.11 -0.103 -0.083 -0.058 -0.046 -0.100 -0.114* -0.121* -0.121* -0.110* 
  (0.06) (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.060) (0.057) (0.055) (0.051) (0.048) 
 c₄ -0.01 0.008 0.012 0.019* 0.011 -0.020 -0.031* -0.039** -0.038** -0.037** 
  (0.01) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
c₁ 2.23 0.680 0.624 0.410 0.315 0.639 0.740 0.738 0.828 0.769* 
  (1.17) (0.462) (0.439) (0.454) (0.475) (0.468) (0.468) (0.451) (0.431) (0.381) 
GDP c₂ 0.09 0.123** 0.118** 0.102** 0.093** 0.109** 0.118** 0.128** 0.131** 0.127** 
  (0.09) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.028) 
Inf c₃ -0.41 -0.111 -0.097 -0.049 -0.028 -0.101 -0.124 -0.126 -0.146 -0.136 
  (0.25) (0.092) (0.089) (0.092) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.092) (0.088) (0.078) 
 c₄ -0.02 0.009 0.012 0.016 0.015 -0.016 -0.028 -0.037** -0.035** -0.033** 
  (0.02) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, while two asterisks indicate 
significant at the 5% level. 
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One explanation for these results can be seen by inspection of Figure 1.1, which plots the 
output gap along with the two measures of inflation.  Because the rate of inflation is still 
decreasing during the period between 1982:2-1983:4, the estimation results are likely influenced 
when the sample period starts during this interval. This can be understood by noting that in the 
central banker optimization problem solved in Surico (2007), the relevant explanatory variable is 
the inflation deviation from its target. If the inflation target is constant, (1.12) is well specified 
because the inflation target component adds to the intercept. However, when the inflation target 
is time-varying, (1.12) is misspecified. During the period 1980:1-1983:4, the inflation rate was 
still falling and thus it is likely that the inflation target was as well. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Inflation Rates and Output Gap 
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1.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated whether the conclusion that asymmetric policy preferences 
for the output gap disappeared during the post-Volker period spanning 1982:4-2003:2.  We show 
this conclusion to be fragile as incrementing the starting period for the estimation a few quarters 
forward shows strong asymmetric policy results. Furthermore, this conclusion is not sensitive to 
the end period of the sample as extending the data until the onset of the financial crisis at 2007:4 
produces the same qualitative effects.  We offer a simple explanation for what accounts for this 
result by showing that during the first few periods after the statutory end of the Volker period of 
1982:4, the inflation rate was still falling rapidly. This suggests that the inflation target was 
likely unstable making regressions which model stable parameter behavior misspecified. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Fiscal Policy Asymmetries and the Sustainability of 
U.S. Government Debt Revisited
5
 
2.1 Introduction 
Interest in the sustainability of the U.S. fiscal policy stance toward public debt became a 
concern to both policy makers and economists during the 1980s when the U.S. started to incur 
large government budget deficits.  Many investigations, including Hamilton and Flavin (1986), 
Trehan and Walsh (1988), Kremers (1989), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Quintos (1995) and Davig 
(2005), used unit root and cointegration empirical methods to provide answers to this question.
6
 
On the other hand, Bohn (1998) used a method that had a policy reaction interpretation.  
He showed that the U.S. government historically responded to increases in the debt-GDP ratio by 
increasing the primary surplus-GDP ratio. That is, the government has historically reacted to 
debt accumulation by taking corrective measures when the debt-GDP ratio starts to rise.  In a 
later paper, Bohn (2007) further defended the policy reaction function approach and built on the 
                                                 
5
 This chapter is the extended version of the paper titled “Fiscal Policy Asymmetries and the Sustainability of US 
Government Debt Revisited” written with Dr. Steven Cassou and Dr. Jesus Vázquez in 2015.  
6
 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) Trehan and Walsh (1988), Quintos (1995) and Davig (2005) found evidence in 
support of sustainability, while Kremers (1989), Hakkio and Rush (1991) were more pessimistic. 
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criticism of the unit root and cointegration methods, by showing that the work which used such 
methods could not properly evaluate sustainability because they implicitly ruled out higher-order 
integration which would still be consistent with the intertemporal government budget constraint. 
In short, Bohn (2007) showed that the intertemporal budget constraint alone imposes very weak 
econometric restrictions on debt and budget deficits and thus the policy reaction function 
approach is an effective way to evaluate the fiscal policy sustainability question.  
Although some level of comfort regarding the sustainability of fiscal policy may have 
been established from this early body of work, the rapidly growing U.S. government debt since 
the start of the Great Recession in late 2007 has thrust the sustainability question back into the 
public consciousness, once again raising doubts about fiscal policy sustainability. This paper 
follows Bohn's (1998, 2007) approach based on the analysis of fiscal reaction functions to revisit 
the issue of U.S. fiscal policy sustainability by not only extending the data series, but by also 
extending the empirical model suggested by Bohn (1998) to account for, (i) the possibility of 
asymmetries in the fiscal reaction function to business cycle conditions, and (ii) changes in the 
size of shocks during the post-World War II period. More precisely, we investigate three related 
empirical models.  The simplest model is a basic linear regression model which is close to the 
empirical model used in Bohn (1998) for the U.S. and Collignon (2012) for a sample of 
European Union countries, while the others are popular switching regression formulations which 
can address policy asymmetries.  One of these non-linear formulations is piecewise linear and is 
such that the basic linear model is nested as a special case. This type of non-linear model has 
been used by Golinelli and Momigliano (2008) and Balassone, Francese and Zotteri (2010) to 
analyze asymmetries in fiscal policy for several European countries. The third formulation is a 
Markov switching model of the form described by Hamilton (1989). The advantage of a Markov 
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switching model over a piece-wise linear model is that the former allows us to handle changes in 
shock volatility in a rather straightforward manner. 
To investigate these issues, we estimate models over two different quarterly intervals of 
time, one running from 1955:1 until 1995:2 and the other from 1955:1 to 2013:3. The former, 
which we call the short sample, is intended to provide a quarterly data series that can roughly 
match the series in Bohn (1998), while the later, which we call the long sample, uses all available 
data.  By investigating these two samples, we are able to demonstrate that the financial crisis and 
Great Recession are sufficiently different from the earlier period that the asymmetric empirical 
methods used in this paper are important and that the sustainability of U.S. government debt 
question needed to be revisited. We find several important results regarding fiscal policy 
modeling and the empirical analysis of fiscal policy for the United States. First, and perhaps 
most important, we find that recent economic data, that include the financial crisis and Great 
Recession, are sufficiently different from earlier data that simple linear models are not 
appropriate for modelling fiscal policy. Second, we find that for the long sample, the fiscal 
response to lagged debt and lagged output gap are asymmetric, however, over the shorter sample, 
the results for lagged debt do not exhibit asymmetric behavior. Third, regarding fiscal policy 
sustainability, we find that the sample period used is important. For the short sample, fiscal 
policy is sustainable, confirming results by Bohn (1998). Over the full sample period, fiscal 
policy is only sustainable during good economic times and is unsustainable during times of 
distress. We interpret the unsustainable behavior during times of distress as evidence that policy 
makers, by running larger budget deficits, are more concerned about getting the economy back 
on track and perhaps temporarily ignore sustainability. This finding that fiscal policy is not 
always sustainable is consistent with the recent doubts expressed by some policy makers and 
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political pundits about sustainability of the U.S. fiscal policy. Finally, regarding the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy, we find robust evidence that fiscal policy is countercyclical during bad economic 
times and becomes less countercyclical during good times. A few of our models even indicate 
that during good economic times fiscal policy may become marginally procyclical. This 
procyclical finding is consistent with results found in Balassone et al. (2010) using European 
data and are interpreted to show that during good times, the government budget deficit-GDP 
ratio grows with the rest of the economy. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the empirical 
models analyzed in this paper. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical findings. In Section 2.4 we 
study an alternative sample period that is similar to the one analyzed by Bohn (1998), in order to 
see if his conclusion about debt sustainability holds up using our richer asymmetric fiscal policy 
empirical models and thus reconcile our empirical results with his findings. Finally, Section 2.5 
concludes. 
2.2 Empirical Equations 
We investigate three related empirical models. The simplest model is a basic linear 
regression model, while the others are popular switching regression formulations.  One of the 
more general formulations is piecewise linear and is such that the basic linear model is nested as 
a special case while the third formulation is nonlinear and, as such, the other two are not nested 
in general. 
Some authors, such as Golinelli and Momigliano (2008), have considered other models 
that are further nested in a few of the switching regression formulations considered here. They 
referred to these different formulations as two parameter models and referred to the piecewise 
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linear formulations considered in this paper as two sample models.  The two sample models are 
more general and nest the two parameter models as restricted cases.  In some earlier work, we 
investigated the two parameter models and tested the restrictions implied between them and the 
two sample models.  We always rejected the restrictions, so here we only present the more 
general two sample models. 
Following Bohn (1998), Balassone et al. (2010) and others, we focus on the primary 
balance as our measure for the fiscal policy stance.
7
 Our models exhibit richer dynamics than the 
one used in Bohn (1998) and some are similar to the one used by Balassone et al. (2010). In 
particular, our models include the lagged primary balance as an explanatory variable to allow for 
fiscal policy persistence.
8
 A significant role of the lagged primary balance may reflect, for 
instance, the existence of an optimal fiscal policy inertia where the fiscal authority aims at 
reaching the optimal primary balance target in small steps due to economic uncertainty. Also, all 
our models only include lagged variables as explanatory variables. This feature allows us to 
interpret our models as fiscal policy rules where the fiscal authority only reacts to variables 
included in its information set. This feature further helps to overcome endogeneity issues which 
may show up when current explanatory variables are used in the empirical model. Finally, two of 
the formulations studied in this paper are nonlinear. We choose this setup as it allows us to not 
only investigate debt sustainability, but it also allows us to investigate fiscal policy cyclicality. 
Further, these nonlinear features help to assess the presence of policy persistence since, as noted 
by Perron (1989), evidence of a persistent process may arise simply as a result of ignoring 
important sources of nonlinearity. 
                                                 
7
 Bohn (1998) actually used the primary surplus which is the primary balance multiplied by -1. 
8
 Afonso, Agnello and Furceri (2010) provided empirical evidence of fiscal policy persistence in a cross-country 
study. 
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The basic regression model can be written as  
 
bt    1bt1  2dt1  3w t1  t,   #   
 
(2.1) 
 
where b t  is the ratio of the primary balance (spending, net of interest expenses, minus taxes) to 
gross domestic product (GDP) at date t  ,  dt1  is the ratio of federal debt to GDP at date t  1  , 
and  1tw   is the output gap at date  t  1  .
9
 In the tables and discussion below, we will often refer 
to this model as the linear model or LM for short. 
The various anticipated signs for the parameters have been discussed in various places in 
the literature.  For instance, following the arguments in Bohn (1998, 2007), sustainability of 
fiscal policy should be marked by negative values of 2 .10 
Intuitively a negative value for  2   indicates that as lagged debt increases, policy makers 
take action to reduce  b t   either by reducing spending or raising taxes. Also, as noted in 
Balassone et al. (2010), the sign of  3   depends on whether policy is procyclical or 
countercyclical.  A positive value corresponds to a procyclical policy, where higher values of the 
lagged output gap are accompanied by higher primary balances either through more government 
spending or lower taxes, while a negative value corresponds to a countercyclical policy. 
Part of our empirical focus will be on a popular asymmetry hypothesis in which the 
policy variable, b t , responds to the lagged output gap, w t1 , differently, depending on whether 
the economy is strong or weak.  To evaluate asymmetry, one approach is to replace the various 
                                                 
9
 There are alternative, but related, formulations used in the literature.  For instance, Golinelli and Momigliano 
(2008) focus on the cyclically-adjusted primary balance and prefer to use differenced levels as the dependent 
variable. 
10
 To be more precise, Bohn (1998) used the primary surplus as his dependent variable rather than the primary 
balance (or deficit) we use here.  For his model, Bohn (1998) argued that sustainability is associated with a positive 
surplus coefficient which would imply that our deficit coefficient should be negative. 
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variables with two interaction terms in which a dummy indicating the strength of the economy at 
period t  1 , It1  , is multiplied by each of the variables to get  
 
 
bt  It1  1It1bt1  2It1dt1  3It1w t1  1  It1
 1
 1  It1bt1  2
 1  It1dt1  3
 1  It1w t1  t,   #   
 
(2.2) 
 
where  It1   is given by  
It1 
0 for w t1  wT,
1 for w t1  wT,
  #   
 
and  wT   is referred to as the threshold value for the lagged output gap. This type of model is 
known as a Threshold Regression model and we will use the abbreviation TR to reference it from 
now on.   
The parameters of (2.2) can provide evidence for a number of interesting policy 
questions.  For instance, asymmetry in the response of the policy variable to economic conditions 
can be noted when  2  2

  or  3  3

 .  If  2  2

 , then there is evidence that policy 
responds to lagged debt differently when the economy is doing well than when it is not, while if  
3  3

 , then there is evidence that policy responds to the lagged output gap differently when 
the economy is doing well than when it is not.  It is also useful to note that (2.1) is nested in 
(2.2).  So one can test whether the TR model fits better than the basic regression model by 
performing an  F   test on the null that    ,  1  1

,  2  2

, and  3  3

 . 
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We also investigate two versions of the two state Markov Switching (MS) empirical 
model. These MS models use a nonlinear relationship between the primary balance and the 
explanatory variables given by 
 bt  st  1stbt1  2stdt1  3stw t1  stut,   #   
 
(2.3) 
 
 
where  u t   is a standard normal random variable and  st   denotes the unobservable regime or 
state variable featuring the reaction of the fiscal authority to both observables entering in its 
information set ( bt1  ,  dt1   and  w t1  ) and the fiscal shocks ( u t  ).  This state variable has 
values of either 1 or 2 and follows a first-order two-state Markov process with transition matrix 
given by  
P 
p11 1  p22
1  p11 p22
,
 
where the row  j  , column  i   element of  P  is the transition probability  p ij  , which is the 
probability that state  i   will be followed by state  j  . Since the transition probabilities beginning 
in each state sum to 1, the off diagonal terms are given by  p12  1  p11   and  p21  1  p22  . 
A somewhat more flexible alternative two-state MS model allows the transition 
probabilities to depend on an observable variable of the economy.  This is more analogous to the 
various TR models which switch between the two linear terms depending on the value of the 
output gap.  We investigated this connection in one of our models. In particular, we also 
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considered a two-state MS model that allowed the transition probabilities to depend on the 
lagged output gap and used a logistic functional form for the probabilities as follows   
p11w t1 
exp10  11w t1
1  exp10  11w t1
,
 
p22w t1 
exp20  21w t1
1  exp20  21w t1
.
 
This type of formulation is described in Filardo (1994).  Because the transition 
probabilities are time varying, we refer to this model as a time varying transition probability 
Markov Switching model, or TVTP-MS for short. One thing to notice is that when the lagged 
output gap does not impact the transition probabilities (i.e. when  11  21  0  ) the TVTP-
MS model collapses into the MS model with constant probabilities. In this case, there is a one-to-
one map between  p11   and  10   and between  p22   and  20  . 
The advantage of these MS models over the TR models is twofold. First, they allow 
changes in the size of shocks during the sample period. Second, they allow the interaction of 
fiscal policy asymmetries with changes in shock volatility. However, it is important to point out 
that fiscal policy sustainability issues in a MS framework does require some extra consideration. 
As shown by Francq and Zakoïan (2001), local stationarity conditions, i.e. stationarity within 
each regime, are neither sufficient nor necessary to achieve the global stationarity of a MS 
system, and thus, for our application, to rule out explosive behavior that results in the violation 
of the intertemporal budget constraint. But, as also pointed out by Francq and Zakoïan (2001), 
this situation occurs when the probability of staying in the same regime is small. As a 
consequence, we argue that the likelihood of explosive behavior largely decreases when local 
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stationary regimes are largely persistent (i.e. when the probability of staying in the same 
stationary regime is close to one).  
2.3 Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis mostly uses quarterly data for the U.S. economy obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis data set. There are two possible government perspectives one 
could use.  One could use the total of the federal, state and local government budgets, which 
would be more closely connected to the data used by Balassone et al. (2010) in their study of 
debt sustainability in European Union countries or one could use just the federal government 
budget.  We used both for our analysis, but report only the results for federal government budget 
perspective below.
11
 
The primary balance series was obtained by dividing minus 100 times the sum of the net 
federal saving series (FGDEF) and federal government interest payments 
(A091RC1Q027SBEA) by the nominal GDP series (GDP).
12
 For the debt variable, we used the 
total public debt series (GFDEBTN) and divided it by the nominal GDP (GDP) series.
13
 For the 
output gap, we computed the difference between the observed annual growth rate and the 
average annual growth rate.  In particular, we computed the growth rate in percentage terms by 
                                                 
11
 We choose the federal government data because the annual data we used in a robustness investigation, not shown 
for the sake of brevity, was more consistent to the quarterly data used in this section.  In other words, the annual 
series for the total federal, state and local government budgets had quite different numerical values from the 
quarterly data series making the comparison between the two data series less clear. 
12
 Note, this computation for the primary balance results in the proper calculation.  The reason that interest payments 
are added to the federal savings series (before multiplying by a negative number) is that the federal saving series is 
the difference between current receipts and current expenditures, where current expenditures includes, among other 
things, interest payments.  By adding the interest payment series, we cancel the interest payment portion of the 
current expenditures. 
13
 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis only has quarterly debt data from 1966:01 to the present, so to get the 
additional 11 years back to 1955:01, we used data from the US treasury which can be found at 
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/mspd.htm. 
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multiplying 100 times the log difference between the current value of real GDP (GDPC1) and 
the value four quarters earlier.  Next these growth rates were averaged and then the average was 
subtracted from the annual growth rate series to give a series that has positive values when the 
current growth rate exceeds the average and negative values when the growth rate is below the 
average.
14
 
Our main empirical analysis uses the data interval from the first quarter of 1955 to the 
third quarter of 2013.  However, in the further investigations, we investigate a restricted data 
interval with the end date of the second quarter of 1995 to conform with Bohn (1998) and 
investigate comparability to his results and to show the importance of the switching regression 
structures which are needed over the full sample. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the results for the various empirical models.  The first column 
describes various parameter possibilities that the different models may take as well as a row for 
the threshold value for the TR models.  As is common in such empirical results tables, many of 
the parameters are specific to particular models that were estimated.  Also, to save space, results 
for the constant terms are not reported.
15
 We use the "AT" and "BT" shorthand when describing 
TR model estimates to indicate parameter estimates when the threshold variable is above the 
threshold and below the threshold, respectively. We also list the parameters for the MS models in 
the same rows as the TR models even though the models, and thus the model parameters, have 
quite different interpretations.  We made this choice to save space in reporting our results, but 
                                                 
14
 In a preliminary draft of the paper, we defined the output gap as the cyclical component of real GDP obtained 
with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The main qualitative conclusions about fiscal asymmetries in regard to both 
sustainability and cyclicality are robust to this alternative definition of the output gap. However, we choose the 
output gap definition described above over the output gap based on the HP filter for two main reasons. First, the use 
of the HP output gap introduces an endogeneity issue in the estimation of our empirical fiscal reaction function since 
the HP filter is a two-sided filter. Second, the interpretation of the empirical fiscal equation as a fiscal reaction 
function become dubious when the HP output gap is a regressor since the HP output gap uses, by construction, much 
more information on GDP than the one available for the policy maker at the time of fiscal policy implementation. 
15
 Complete tables with all the constant terms can be obtained upon request. 
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would like to take a moment to clearly spell out the different interpretations for the parameters to 
avoid confusion.  Table 2.1 shows that we grouped the above threshold parameters for the TR 
models with the state 1, s1, parameters for the MS models and the below threshold parameters for 
the TR models with the state 2, s₂, parameters for the MS models.   Although there is some logic 
to grouping these parameters as we have, there are also important differences.  For the TR 
models, the AT parameters are the values for the linear portion of the model when the output gap 
is observed to be above the threshold, while for the MS model, the s1 parameters are the values 
for the linear portion of the model when the unobserved state variable is in regime 1, which is 
shown below to be mostly associated with recent expansionary periods.  Similarly, for the TR 
models, the BT parameters are the values for the linear portion of the model when the output gap 
is observed to be below the threshold, while for the MS model, the s₂ parameters are the values 
for the linear portion of the model when the unobserved state variable is in regime 2, which is 
somewhat related to economic downturns. 
The second column presents the results of the basic regression model given by (2.1), 
which was run using OLS.  This model has no threshold, so the first row is left blank as are many 
of the later rows which correspond to parameters from alternative models.  This regression finds 
the lagged dependent variable is somewhat less than 1 and is highly significant, showing 
evidence of a highly persistent fiscal rule, the lagged debt coefficient is negative and 
insignificant and the lagged output gap coefficient is negative and significant.  Even though it is 
insignificant, the negative sign on the lagged debt coefficient is useful to note because, as 
emphasized by Bohn (1998, 2007), Collignon (2012) and others, a negative value can be viewed 
as being consistent with a sustainable fiscal policy. In particular, high values of debt imply lower 
primary deficit values, which result in a decrease in the debt level the following period.  Next 
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note that the negative coefficient on the lagged output gap indicates that fiscal policy is 
countercyclical. Toward the bottom of the column are various measures of fit, which are used for 
comparison purposes with the alternative models.   
The remaining columns of Table 2.1 present various nonlinear models in which the 
dependent variable is a nonlinear function of the various economic variables.
16
 Part of the 
motivation for these models is to explore asymmetric policy and, furthermore, to see how fiscal 
policy sustainability results are impacted when the model is flexible enough to handle 
asymmetric policy responses.  However, these models can also be motivated by statistical 
testing.  One type of statistical test is a procedure suggested by Teräsvirta (1994).  For our 
application, the test begins by first running the basic LM model (2.1) and obtaining the residuals, 
which we denote e t .  Next an unrestricted regression given by 
et     1
 bt1  2
 dt1  3
 w t1
 11bt1w t1   12dt1w t1   13w t1w t1 
 21bt1w t1
2   22dt1w t1
2   23w t1w t1
2 
 31bt1w t1
3   32dt1w t1
3   33w t1w t1
3   t,
 
is run.  Testing for the presence of nonlinearity amounts to testing whether the added terms are 
significant.  In particular, this amounts to testing 
H0 : ij  0 for i  1,2,3 and j  1,2,3 .
 
We implemented this and found an F -statistic value of 2.831.  The 5% critical value for 
this statistic can be found in a standard table of the F  distribution with 9 degrees of freedom in 
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 It is useful to emphasize that although the TR models are linear in the interaction terms denoted in equation (2.2), 
they are nonlinear in the economic variables. 
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the numerator and infinity in the denominator and is equal to 1.880. We see that linearity is 
rejected and conclude there is nonlinearity. 
Since nonlinear models are appropriate for exploration, consider the estimates for the TR 
model presented in column 3.
17
 This model uses the lagged output gap as the threshold variable 
and is analogous to the Balassone et al. (2010) model in that the threshold value is arbitrarily set 
to 0, hence the TR-0 notation.  Estimates for the coefficients are mostly consistent with the LM 
regression. To be more specific, looking down column 3, we see that when the economy was 
both above and below potential output in the previous period (i.e. both above and below the 
threshold value of zero), the lagged balance coefficients are highly significant and close to one. 
We see that the lagged debt coefficient is negative and insignificant when the lagged output was 
above potential and positive and insignificant when the economy was below potential.  
Furthermore, the lagged output gap coefficients are negative when the economy was both above 
and below potential in the previous period, but only the below potential coefficient is significant. 
The coefficients on the lagged debt and output gap variables provide insight into how 
fiscal policy makers behave.  In particular, the negative lagged debt coefficient during above 
threshold values for the lagged output gap shows a sustainability feature to fiscal policy when the 
economy is doing well, while the positive lagged debt coefficient during below threshold values 
could be interpreted as showing that policy makers are more concerned with getting the economy 
back on track than fiscal policy sustainability during downturns.  In other words, the positive 
coefficient indicates that during times of distress policy makers temporarily forgo fiscal policy 
sustainability (i.e. a long-term goal) in favor of trying to revive the economy back to a situation 
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 In our preliminary empirical analysis, we also investigated logistic smooth TR and exponential smooth TR type 
nonlinear models.  These models did not fit as well as the MS models, so they have been left out of the final draft of 
the paper. 
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with higher-than-average output growth rates (i.e. a short-term priority), at which time they then 
follow a sustainable fiscal policy program. To some extent, this interpretation is consistent with 
ideas developed in Collignon (2012), where he noted that various European stability agreements 
allow for temporary deviations from various sustainability rules. However, we should qualify 
this conclusion by noting that the insignificant value for both debt coefficients does weaken this 
interpretation.  A similar asymmetric contingent interpretation can be made for the lagged output 
gap coefficients.  In particular, the larger (in absolute value) and significant coefficient during 
the below threshold case shows that policy makers are more focused on getting the economy on 
track during downturns than during good times where the coefficient is somewhat smaller (in 
absolute value) and is insignificant.  This interpretation is consistent with the asymmetric fiscal 
policy result found in Balassone et al. (2010) for a sample of fourteen European Union countries 
and shows a strong countercyclical response when economic conditions are poor.  The various fit 
parameters toward the bottom of the table show that the TR-0 model fits better than the simple 
LM model and the null hypothesis that there is no improvement in the fit, as indicated by the row 
labeled F  Stat , shows an F -statistic of 2.513, which is greater than the 5% critical value of 
2.371, and thus can be rejected. 
The fourth column of Table 2.1 presents the estimates for a TR model in which the 
threshold is endogenously chosen so as to obtain the best fit.  We distinguish it by using the TR-
E notation.  The best fitting threshold for this model occurs at a lagged output gap value of -
1.870 which is somewhat lower than the zero threshold used in the TR-0 model.  The parameter 
estimates for this model are largely the same as those for the zero threshold model and can be 
interpreted as showing the same countercyclical behavior for fiscal policy makers.  In particular, 
the lagged debt coefficients provide some weak evidence for fiscal policy sustainability during 
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good times, but show that during bad times concerns toward improving the economy overwhelm 
sustainability concerns.  Similarly, the negative coefficients on the lagged output gap show that 
fiscal policy is countercyclical.  Furthermore, this policy is asymmetric in that there is a greater 
level of intervention during economic downturns. One difference between the endogenous TR 
model and the zero threshold TR model is that two of the coefficients which were insignificant in 
the zero threshold TR model are significantly different from zero in the endogenous TR.  Finally, 
looking at the various measures of fit at the bottom of the fourth column we see that the 
endogenous threshold TR model fits somewhat better than the zero threshold TR model. The test 
that this model fits no better than the LM model, as indicated by the row labeled F  Stat , has an 
F -statistic of 4.483, which is larger than the 5% critical value of 4.122, and thus is easily 
rejected.
18
 
The next two columns of Table 2.1 show the two-state MS model formulation parameter 
estimates.  The fifth column shows the parameter estimates for the two-state MS formulation in 
which the switching probabilities are constant, hence the added notation below the MS notation, 
while the sixth column is a two-state MS model in which the transition probabilities are time 
varying, hence the notation TVTP. Before describing the estimation results, it is useful to study 
Figure 2.1 in order to understand how to interpret the two-state conditions.  Figure 2.1 shows the 
smoothed state 1, s1, probability for the constant probability MS model.
19
 Focusing on the boom 
economic period of the 1990s, one can see that the probability of being in state 1 is very high.  
                                                 
18
 The critical value of 4.122 does not come from a conventional F distribution table.  We computed this number by 
using a bootstrap simulation procedure described in Hansen (1997) which showed that the F-statistic in TR models 
do not have F distributions and that proper critical values can be found using a bootstrap procedure. 
19
 The smoothed probabilities are computed using the information over the whole sample of size T (i.e., 
probst  1|IT) as discussed in Hamilton (1994, p. 694). The plot for the MS model in which the transition 
probabilities are time varying is very similar. Moreover, Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 below show the smoothed 
probabilities along with various business cycle turning points which have been dated by the NBER. 
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Similarly, during the boom period of the middle 2000s, Figure 2.1 shows a high probability of 
being in state 1.  These high probabilities for state 1 during good economic times show that we 
can say that state 1 is generally associated with good economic times and correspondingly, state 
2 is generally associated with poor economic times. Moreover, state 1 is also strongly associated 
with the Great Moderation period, which is characterized by low volatility.
20
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 The precise dating for the Great Moderation is the subject of debate, but many studies, such as Stock and Watson 
(2002), have suggested this low volatility period starts around 1984.  Furthermore, although the debate is still open, 
the end of this low volatility period likely ended with the financial crisis in late 2007. 
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Table 2.1: Federal Government Primary Balance (1955:1 - 2013:3) 
 
LM TR-0 TR-E MS MS 
Threshold    
const prob. TVTP 
 
0 -1.87 
  Lagged Balance 0.924** 
    
 
(0.021) 
    Lagged Debt -0.001 
    
 
(0.003) 
    Lagged Output Gap -0.104** 
    
 
(0.018) 
    Lagged Balance - AT or s₁ 
 
0.937** 0.942** 0.936** 0.936** 
  
(0.036) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lagged Balance - BT or s₂ 
 
0.877** 0.779** 0.861** 0.863** 
  
(0.030) (0.052) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lagged Debt - AT or s₁ 
 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.012** -0.012** 
  
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged Debt - BT or s₂ 
 
0.005 0.018** 0.006 0.006 
  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lagged Output Gap - AT or s₁ 
 
-0.023 -0.061** 0.015** 0.015* 
  
(0.045) (0.030) (0.008) (0.009) 
Lagged Output Gap - BT or s₂ 
 
-0.177** -0.260** -0.173** -0.173** 
  
(0.036) (0.082) (0.037) (0.037) 
1st-regime volatility σ(s₁) 
   
0.129** 0.129** 
    
(0.016) (0.016) 
2nd-regime volatility σ(s₂) 
   
0.760** 0.759** 
    
(0.079) (0.079) 
p₁₁ or θ₁₀ 
   
0.982** 4.053** 
    
(0.014) (0.763) 
p₂₂ or θ₂₀ 
   
0.884** 2.028** 
    
(0.016) (0.158) 
θ₁₁ 
    
-0.107 
     
(0.154) 
θ₂₁ 
    
-0.101* 
     
(0.060) 
RSS 90.383 86.55 83.765 
  AIC 1066.453 1064.269 1056.585 
  SBC 1080.292 1091.946 1084.262 
  log-likelihood 
   
-126.676 -126.11 
F-Stat 
 
2.513** 4.483** 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, while two 
asterisks indicate significant at the 5% level. AT and BT stand for above threshold and below threshold 
respectively. 
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Now focusing on the parameter estimates we see that, like the two TR models, the two 
MS models have very similar estimation results to each other and even to the TR models.  Both 
show that the lagged balance coefficients are near 1 and significant in both states, the response to 
lagged debt is asymmetric, showing a negative and significant coefficient during state s1  but an 
insignificant coefficient during state  s₂, and the response to the lagged output gap is asymmetric, 
showing a negative and significant coefficient during state s2 but a positive and marginally 
significant coefficient during state s1. Moreover, the volatility of innovations in state 1, σ(s₁), is 
roughly five times lower than the volatility of innovations in state 2, σ(s2). It is important to keep 
in mind this changing volatility feature uncovered by the MS formulation when comparing the 
estimation results obtained from the two approaches because the TR formulation assumes, in 
contrast to the MS formulation, an identical level of innovation volatility both above and below 
the threshold level.  
Since state s1 is generally associated with good economic times and s2 is generally 
associated with poor economic times, the interpretations for these coefficients are largely the 
same as described for the TR models.  In particular, during good economic times they show 
sustainability of fiscal policy and less concern with countercyclical policy, while during weak 
economic times they show no concern with sustainability of fiscal policy and a countercyclical 
fiscal policy.  However, it is useful to point out that the fiscal policy sustainability result during 
good times is considerably stronger with the MS models than with the TR models as the good 
economic time coefficients are larger (in absolute value) and highly significant.  Put differently, 
one can say that the MS models show stronger evidence that during the good economic times, 
which feature low volatility, policy makers are focused on fiscal policy sustainability. 
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Finally let us comment a bit on the parameters for the transition probabilities.  Focusing 
on the constant probability model, we see that probability of staying in state 1 if one begins in 
state 1, p11 , is very high at 0.982, while the probability of staying in state 2 if one begins in state 
2, p22 , is smaller at 0.884.  These estimates show that there is high persistence for both states, 
with the persistence during good times being larger. As noted above, the high persistence of the 
fiscal sustainability state given by a value of p11 that is close to one reduces the likelihood of a 
situation described by Francq and Zakoïan (2001) and increases the likelihood that there is global 
fiscal policy sustainability. To understand the results for the time varying transition probability 
MS model, it is sufficient to look at the two parameters associated with the lagged output gap, 
11   and  21 .  Both are insignificant, which means that the transition probabilities for these 
models are largely the same as the constant probability MS model.  This result is consistent with 
the fact that the parameter estimates for the two MS models are very close. 
 
Figure 2.1: Two-State MS Model 
Let us conclude this section with a brief summary of the key findings.  In general, we 
find that there was a sequence of improvements in the fit and performance of the models 
State 1 smoothed probability
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presented.  While the linear model exhibited desirable properties, such as debt sustainability and 
countercyclical behavior, it did not fit as well as both versions of the TR models which allowed 
asymmetric behavior on the part of policy makers.  However the TR models showed their own 
weaknesses.  For instance, they did not show debt sustainability during weak economic times.  
This behavior is interpreted as reasonable as it shows that during weak economic times policy 
makers are more concerned with getting the economy back on track.  The MS models also 
showed some debt sustainability issues during weak economic times, but the coefficients were 
smaller than the TR models and insignificant.  In addition, the good economic times showed 
larger (in absolute value) lagged debt coefficients indicating a stronger response towards fiscal 
policy sustainability. 
2.4 An Alternative Sample Period 
In this section we undertake an investigation which more directly compares our results 
with those in Bohn (1998).  Using annual U.S. data from 1916 to 1995, Bohn (1998) argued that 
fiscal policy is consistent with sustainability in a simple static linear regression model.  Here, we 
show that a similar, but dynamic, linear regression methodology as the one used by Bohn over 
this shorter sample is appropriate, but we also argue that when using the longer sample used in 
Section 2.3, the nonlinear models are more appropriate. Before discussing these results, let us 
first describe the data. 
Since our quarterly data set begins in 1955:1, we cannot match the annual data starting 
date used in Bohn (1998), but we can match the end date of 1995 which we do with 1995:2 for 
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our sample.
21
  For ease of exposition, we will often refer to this data interval as the short sample 
while the longer data period from Section 2.3 will be referred to as the full sample.   
Table 2.2 displays the results for the same models as in Table 2.1 using this short sample 
data. Table 2.2 shows many consistencies with the results from Section 2.3, but it also shows a 
few differences. One key difference between the short and long samples concerns the lagged 
debt parameter. The short sample shows a somewhat symmetric and sustainable fiscal policy. 
Indeed, the lagged debt coefficient in the LM is negative, significant and close to the 
corresponding estimated values under the two regimes associated with the TR and MS models. 
This contrasts with the long sample results in Section 2.3, which only showed the negative debt 
sustainability coefficients during above threshold or state 1 periods.  These short sample results 
are in line with the results in Bohn (1998) who only used a simple linear model and show that 
fiscal policy does exhibit fiscal policy sustainability for this interval of time.  It is also useful to 
point out that one could interpret the difference between these short and long sample results as 
showing that the addition of 18 years of data makes the question of fiscal policy sustainability 
less clear.  This may in part account for the growing concern for the size of the U.S. government 
debt and deficits seen in more recent political debates. 
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 Moreover, Bohn (1998) also studied several subsamples, finding similar results to those found in his reference 
sample. One of his sample robustness exercises covered the period 1948-1995, which is rather similar to the sample 
period analyzed in this section. 
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Table 2.2: Federal Government Primary Balance (1955:1 - 1995:2) 
 
LM TR-0 TR-E MS MS 
    
Const prob. TVTP 
Threshold 
 
0 -2.41 
  Lagged Balance 0.796** 
    
 
(0.041) 
    Lagged debt -0.010** 
    
 
(0.004) 
    Lagged Output Gap -0.081** 
    
 
(0.019) 
    Lagged Balance - AT or s₁ 
 
0.828** 0.824** 0.935** 0.934** 
  
(0.059) (0.044) (0.013) (0.013) 
Lagged Balance - BT or s₂ 
 
0.754** 0.565** 0.715** 0.716** 
  
(0.057) (0.097) (0.084) (0.084) 
Lagged debt - AT or s₁ 
 
-0.007 -0.009* -0.009** -0.009** 
  
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged debt - BT or s₂ 
 
-0.011* -0.015 -0.011* -0.011* 
  
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lagged Output Gap - AT or 
s₁ 
 
-0.035 -0.047* 0.005 0.004 
  
(0.044) (0.028) (0.007) (0.007) 
Lagged Output Gap - BT or 
s₂ 
 
-0.141** -0.386** -0.132** -0.132** 
  
(0.043) (0.116) (0.034) (0.034) 
1st-regime volatility σ(s₁) 
   
0.080** 0.081** 
    
(0.009) (0.009) 
2nd-regime volatility σ(s₂) 
   
0.711** 0.712** 
    
(0.091) (0.090) 
p₁₁ or θ₁₀ 
   
0.999** 15.337** 
    
(0.002) (0.828) 
p₂₂ or θ₂₀ 
   
0.870** 1.900** 
    
(0.016) (0.141) 
θ₁₁ 
    
0.241 
     
(0.561) 
θ₂₁ 
    
-0.098 
     
(0.063) 
RSS 53.769 52.616 50.185 
  AIC 665.519 658.009 650.346 
  SBC 665.87 682.71 675.047 
  log-likelihood 
   
-72.98 -72.498 
F-Stat 
 
0.843 2.749 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, while two 
asterisks indicate significant at the 5% level. AT and BT stand for above threshold and below threshold 
respectively. 
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The results for the lagged output gap coefficient are largely the same between the two 
sample periods for both the TR and MS models.  In particular, we see an asymmetric response to 
the lagged output gap in both samples with stronger countercyclical policy applied during 
economic weaknesses. Furthermore, as with the long sample, the short sample shows some 
differences between the TR models and the MS models, in that the TR models show 
countercyclical policy both above and below the threshold, while the MS models only show 
countercyclical policy during state 2. 
Finally, we consider whether the nonlinear models are important for this data interval.  
First consider the nonlinear model test suggested by Teräsvirta (1994) which was described 
earlier.  Running the same test as before, we found an F-statistic of 1.653 which is smaller than 
the 5% critical value of 1.880.  Thus we reject the null that there is a nonlinearity in the data 
which is in contrast to the test over the full sample. Second, consider the tests that the threshold 
TR models fits no better than the LM model. As indicated by the row labeled StatF   in Table 
2.2, the F -statistic of 0.843 for the zero threshold TR model is lower than the critical value of 
2.371 from the regular F -distribution and the F -statistic of 2.749 for the endogenous threshold 
TR model is lower than the critical value of 4.147 computed using Hansen (1997) bootstrap 
procedure for the short sample. These tests show that the LM is not rejected for the short sample 
which is in contrast to the test over the full sample. Next consider the probability diagram 
associated with the constant probability MS model.  Figure 2.2 displays the analogous short 
sample diagram to the long sample diagram given in Figure 2.1.  This figure shows that the 
probability of being in state 1 is very low throughout the sample period.  Interestingly, toward 
the end of the short sample, we do see a rising probability of being in state 1 and this period 
corresponds with some of the data periods in the long sample that also have a high probability of 
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being in state 1.  However, overall, state 1 does not appear to be useful for fitting the model and 
this indicates that the simple linear model similar to the one used by Bohn (1998) is sufficient to 
fit the data. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Two-State MS Model (Sample 1955-1995) 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper has found several important results regarding fiscal policy modelling and the 
empirical analysis of fiscal policy for the United States.  First, and perhaps most importantly, we 
showed that recent economic data, that include the financial crisis and Great Recession, are 
sufficiently different from earlier data. Therefore, the simple linear models are not appropriate 
for modelling fiscal policy.   
Regarding our policy findings, we find that over a sample that includes the financial 
crisis and the Great Recession, the fiscal responses to lagged debt and lagged output gap are 
asymmetric, however, over the shorter sample, which ended in the second quarter of 1995, the 
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results for lagged debt did not exhibit asymmetric behavior. Regarding fiscal policy 
sustainability, we also find that the sample period used is important.  For the short sample, fiscal 
policy is sustainable, confirming results by Bohn (1998), while over the full sample period, fiscal 
policy is only sustainable during good economic times.  While fiscal policy does not appear to be 
sustainable during times of distress over the full sample, we interpret this as evidence that policy 
makers are more concerned about getting the economy back on track and perhaps temporarily 
ignore sustainability. Overall, these empirical findings suggest that the fiscal sustainability 
question does become less clear when using data that includes the recent financial crisis and the 
Great Recession. 
Regarding the cyclicality of fiscal policy, our analysis found robust evidence that fiscal 
policy is countercyclical during bad economic times and becomes less countercyclical during 
good times.  A few of our models even indicated that during good economic times fiscal policy 
may become marginally procyclical. These latter findings are consistent with results found in 
Balassone et al. (2010) using European data and are interpreted to show that during good times, 
the government budget deficit-GDP ratio grows with the rest of the economy.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Do U.S. Government Expenditures and Tax Revenues 
Respond to Debt Levels and Economic Conditions 
Asymmetrically Over the Business Cycle? 
3.1 Introduction 
Whether fiscal policy is countercyclical or procyclical and whether the reaction of fiscal 
variables is symmetric or asymmetric over the cycle are important questions which recently 
attracted a lot of attention. Over the last decades, several empirical works have analyzed the 
behavior of budgetary policies over the business cycle in different countries. Reviewing a group 
of 21 studies on the behavior of fiscal policy, Golinelli and Momigliano (2008) shows that the 
results of these studies are quite mixed. While some of these investigations conclude that policies 
tend to be procyclical, others suggest that policies are countercyclical. Furthermore, these studies 
find mixed results about the asymmetry in reactions of fiscal policy to business cycle conditions. 
The different results obtained by the empirical literature may in principle depend on the model of 
policy decisions used, the estimation procedures adopted, the countries included in the sample, 
the periods of time analyzed, or the source of data selected. Most of these studies such as 
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Balassone, Francese and Zotteri (2010) assessing the fiscal behavior in EMU
22
countries. One 
exception is Cassou, Shadmani, and Vázquez (2015) which investigates the asymmetry in 
behavior of fiscal policy for the United States. 
Cassou et al. (2015) investigates the asymmetric reaction of the federal government 
primary surplus to business cycle condition and incorporate this issue with the sustainability of 
fiscal policy in U.S. economy which attracted a lot of attention recently after the financial crisis 
and the Great Recession period of late 2007. Focusing on the U.S. quarterly data over the period 
of 1955:1 to 2013:3, they find strong evidence of asymmetric countercyclical reactions of fiscal 
policy to debt levels and economic conditions over the business cycle, with the primary deficit 
increasing during times of distress more severely than decreasing during expansion periods. In 
particular, using popular regime switching models such as Threshold Regression models (TR) 
and Markov Switching models (MS) they show that the reactions of fiscal policy to debt to GDP 
ratio and to the output gap as a proxy of economic conditions significantly depends on the 
strength of the economy. Furthermore, their empirical results find that fiscal policy is sustainable 
during economic good times, but less sustainable in economic bad times.
23
 
One interpretation for this asymmetric behavior, provided in this paper, is that generally 
during bad times policy makers try to get the economy back on track through increasing 
government expenditure or cutting taxes, in order to revive the economy back to a situation with 
higher-than-average output growth rates. This reaction results in accumulation of debt in next 
period, hence an unsustainable policy. 
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 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union 
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 According to Cassou et al. (2015), fiscal policy is sustainable if policy makers take corrective action in response 
to an increase in debt levels (by increasing taxes to decreasing expenditure). 
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The main purpose of this paper is to provide more details on the empirical analysis used 
in Cassou et al. (2015) and investigate the source of the asymmetry in the reaction of fiscal 
policy as shown in their paper. Whether this asymmetry arises from the government expenditure 
or tax revenues is an unsettled question in their paper that is going to be addressed in this paper. 
To investigate this issue, we decompose the policy variable, the primary deficit, into the 
tax revenues and the primary expenditure.
24
 Then, we separately estimate the same regime 
switching models, as proposed by Cassou et al. (2015), for each budget component series. This 
approach is analogous to the one used in Balassone et al. (2010) for a sample of 14 European 
countries and used in Sorensen and Yosha (2001) for 48 continental states.
25
 
We find several important results regarding the reactions of budget components for the 
United States. First, most of our empirical models find that both series, i.e. federal government 
tax revenues and federal government primary expenditure, behave in an asymmetric fashion 
which is analogous to the asymmetric fiscal policy shown in Cassou et al. (2015). In particular, 
our empirical analysis generally shows that responses of both series to debt to GDP ratio highly 
depend on the strength of the economy. In other words, only during the economic good times the 
responses of the budget components to the accumulation of debt imply fiscal sustainability. In 
addition, most of the empirical models find solid evidence of countercyclical reaction of tax 
revenues and primary expenditure to business cycle conditions, with being more effective at 
mitigating the economic slumps than at muting booms. Finally, it is useful to note that the results 
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 Primary expenditure is government current expenditure net of interest payment. 
25
 Balassone et al. (2010) finds significant cyclical asymmetry in the behaviour of fiscal variables in a sample of 14 
EU countries over 1970--2007, with budgetary balances (both overall and primary) deteriorating in contractions 
without correspondingly improving in expansions. Their analysis of budget components reveals that cyclical 
asymmetry comes from expenditure. 
Sorensen and Yosha (2001) find that state revenue and expenditure display significant asymmetry over the business 
cycle, with nearly offsetting effects on the budget surplus. As a result, state fiscal policytends to mute economic 
booms to roughly the same degree it mitigates slowdowns. 
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of MS models for the expenditure series cannot be interpreted in a way which is useful for our 
purpose since in this model the two regimes are not necessarily associated with economic boom 
times and bad times. Therefore, for the expenditure series, we can conclude that TR model is the 
most appropriate model for the purpose of our investigation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the empirical models 
analyzed in this paper. Section 3.3 discusses the empirical findings. Finally, Section 3.4 
concludes. 
3.2 Empirical Equations 
Following Cassou et al. (2015), we investigate three related empirical models.  The 
simplest model is a basic linear regression model, while the others are popular switching 
regression formulations.  One of the more general formulations is piecewise linear and is such 
that the basic linear model is nested as a special case while the third formulation is nonlinear and, 
as such, the other two are not nested in general. 
Some authors, such as Golinelli et al. (2008) and Balassone et al. (2010), have considered 
other models that are further nested in a few of the switching regression formulations considered 
here.  They referred to these different formulations as two parameter models and referred to the 
piecewise linear formulations considered in this paper as two sample models.  The two sample 
models are more general and nest the two parameter models as restricted cases.
26
 
Following Balassone et al. (2010), in order to analyze the cyclical behavior of different 
budget components we focus on the tax revenues and primary expenditure as our measure for the 
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 In some earlier work, we investigated the two parameter models and tested the restrictions implied between them 
and the two sample models.  We always rejected the restrictions, so here we only present the more general two 
sample models. 
43 
fiscal policy stance. In particular, in our model each component depends on its lagged value, the 
lagged debt, and the lagged output gap. Our models include the lagged value of each component 
as an explanatory variable to allow for fiscal policy persistence.
27
 
A significant role of the lagged value of each component may reflect, for instance, the 
existence of an optimal fiscal policy inertia where the fiscal authority aims at reaching the 
optimal target for the policy variable in small steps due to economic uncertainty. Also, all our 
models only include lagged variables as explanatory variables. This feature allows us to interpret 
our models as fiscal policy rules where the fiscal authority only reacts to variables included in its 
information set. This feature further helps to overcome endogeneity issues which may show up 
when current explanatory variables are used in the empirical model. Finally, two of the 
formulations studied in this paper are nonlinear. We choose this setup as it allows us to 
investigate the asymmetry in reactions of budget components to business cycle conditions. 
Further, these nonlinear features help to assess the presence of policy persistence since, as noted 
by Perron (1989), evidence of a persistent process may arise simply as a result of ignoring 
important sources of nonlinearity.  
The basic regression model can be written as 
 ,131211 ttttt wdXX     (3.1) 
where  X t   is the ratio of the budget components (tax revenues  X t
R
  or primary expenditure  X t
G
) 
to gross domestic product (GDP) at date  t  ,  dt1   is the ratio of federal debt to GDP at date  
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 Afonso, Agnello and Furceri (2010) provided empirical evidence of fiscal policy persistence in a cross-country 
study. 
44 
t  1  , and  w t1   is the output gap at date  t  1  .28 In the tables and discussion below, we will 
often refer to this model as the linear model or LM for short.   
The various anticipated signs for the parameters have been discussed in various places in 
the literature. For instance, following the arguments in Cassou et al. (2015), sustainability of 
fiscal policy should be marked by negative values of  2   when  Xt  Xt
G
 , and positive values 
of  2   when  Xt  Xt
R
 .
29
 Intuitively for primary expenditure regression a negative value for  
2   indicates that as lagged debt increases, policy makers take action to reduce spending  X t
G
 , 
and for tax revenues regression a positive value for  2   indicates that as lagged debt increases, 
policy makers take action to increase tax revenues  X t
R
 . Also, as noted in Balassone et al. 
(2010), the sign of  3   depends on whether policy is procyclical or countercyclical. For primary 
expenditure regression a positive value, corresponds to a procyclical policy, where higher values 
of the lagged output gap are accompanied by higher government spending, while a negative 
value corresponds to a countercyclical policy. Conversely, for tax revenues regression a positive 
value corresponds to a countercyclical policy, where higher values of the lagged output gap are 
accompanied by higher tax revenues, while a negative value corresponds to a procyclical policy.  
Part of our empirical focus will be on a popular asymmetry hypothesis in which the 
policy variable, X t  , responds to the explanatory variables, differently, depending on whether the 
economy is strong or weak. To evaluate asymmetry, one approach is to replace the various 
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 Primary expenditure is government current expenditure net of interest payment. 
    There are alternative, but related, formulations used in the literature.  For instance, Golinelli et al. (2008) focus on 
the cyclically-adjusted primary balance and prefer to use differenced levels as the dependent variable. Balassone et 
al. (2010) used the lagged value of the other budget items and the change in interest spending and its lagged level as 
other explanatory variables. 
29
 To be more precise, Cassou et al. (2015) used the primary deficit (government spending net of interest payment 
minus government tax revenue) as their dependent variable.  For their model, sustainability is associated with a 
negative coefficient for the lagged debt. 
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variables with two interaction terms in which a dummy indicating the strength of the economy at 
period  t  1 , It1  , is multiplied by each of the variables to get  
 
X t  It1  1It1X t1  2It1dt1  3It1w t1  1  It1
 1
 1  It1X t1  2
 1  It1dt1  3
 1  It1w t1  t,   #    
(3.2) 
where  Xt  Xt
R
  or  X t
G
  , and  It1   is given by  
It1 
0 for w t1  wT,
1 for w t1  wT,
  #   
 
and  w
T
  is referred to as the threshold value for the lagged output gap. This type of model is 
known as a Threshold Regression model and we will use the abbreviation TR to reference it from 
now on.   
The parameters of (3.2) can provide evidence for a number of interesting policy 
questions.  For instance, asymmetry in the response of the policy variable to economic conditions 
can be noted when  2  2

  or  3  3

 .  If  2  2

 , then there is evidence that the budget 
component responds to lagged debt differently when the economy is doing well than when it is 
not, while if  3  3

 , then there is evidence that the budget component responds to the lagged 
output gap differently when the economy is doing well than when it is not. It is also useful to 
note that (3.1) is nested in (3.2). So one can test whether the TR model fits better than the basic 
regression model by performing an  F   test on the null that    ,  1  1

,  2  2

 , and  
3  3

 . 
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We also investigate the two state Markov Switching (MS) empirical model. These MS 
models use a nonlinear relationship between the primary balance and the explanatory variables 
given by 
 
Xt  st  1stXt1  2stdt1  3stwt1  stut,   #    (3.3) 
where  u t   is a standard normal random variable and  st   denotes the unobservable regime or 
state variable featuring the reaction of the fiscal authority to both observables entering in its 
information set ( X t1  ,  dt1   and  w t1  ) and the fiscal shocks ( u t  ).  This state variable has 
values of either 1 or 2 and follows a first-order two-state Markov process with transition matrix 
given by  
P 
p11 1  p22
1  p11 p22
,
 
where the row  j  , column  i   element of  P  is the transition probability  p ij  , which is the 
probability that state  i   will be followed by state  j  . Since the transition probabilities beginning 
in each state sum to 1, the off diagonal terms are given by  p12  1  p11  and  p21  1  p22  . 
The advantage of these MS models over the TR models is twofold. First, they allow 
changes in the size of shocks during the sample period. Second, they allow the interaction of 
fiscal policy asymmetries with changes in shock volatility. 
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3.3 Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis uses quarterly data for the U.S. economy from the first quarter of 
1955 to the third quarter of 2013 which are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
data set. 
The tax revenues series was obtained by dividing 100 times the federal government 
current receipts (FGRECPT) by the nominal GDP series (GDP). The primary expenditure series 
was obtained by dividing 100 times the federal government current expenditures (FGEXPND) 
minus federal government interest payments (A091RC1Q027SBEA) by the nominal GDP series 
(GDP). For the debt variable, we used the total public debt series (GFDEBTN) and divided it by 
the nominal GDP (GDP) series.
30
 
For the output gap, we computed the difference between the observed annual growth rate 
and the average annual growth rate. In particular, we computed the growth rate in percentage 
terms by multiplying 100 times the log difference between the current value of real GDP 
(GDPC1) and the value four quarters earlier. Next these growth rates were averaged and then the 
average was subtracted from the annual growth rate series to give a series that has positive values 
when the current growth rate exceeds the average and negative values when the growth rate is 
below the average.
31
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 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis only has quarterly debt data from 1966:01 to the present, so to get the 
additional 11 years back to 1955:01, we used data from the US treasury which can be found at 
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/mspd.htm. 
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As noted in Cassou et al. (2015), we choose the output gap definition described above over the output gap based 
on the HP filter for two main reasons. First, the use of the HP output gap introduces an endogeneity issue in the 
estimation of our empirical fiscal reaction function since the HP filter is a two-sided filter. Second, the interpretation 
of the empirical fiscal equation as a fiscal reaction function become dubious when the HP output gap is a regressor 
since the HP output gap uses, by construction, much more information on GDP than the one available for the policy 
maker at the time of fiscal policy implementation.  
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Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 summarize the results for the various empirical models for the 
tax revenues and the primary expenditure, respectively. The first column of the Tables describes 
various parameter possibilities that the different models may take as well as a row for the 
threshold value for the TR models. As is common in such empirical results, many of the 
parameters are specific to particular models that were estimated. Also, to save space, results for 
the constant terms are not reported.
32
 
We use the "AT" and "BT" shorthand when describing TR model estimates to indicate 
parameter estimates when the threshold variable is above the threshold and below the threshold, 
respectively. We also list the parameters for the MS models in the same rows as the TR models 
even though the models, and thus the model parameters, have quite different interpretations. We 
made this choice to save space in reporting our results, but would like to take a moment to 
clearly spell out the different interpretations for the parameters to avoid confusion. Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2 show that we grouped the above threshold parameters for the TR models with the state 
1, s₁, parameters for the MS models and the below threshold parameters for the TR models with 
the state 2, s₂, parameters for the MS models. Although there is some logic to grouping these 
parameters as we have, there are also important differences. For the TR models, the AT 
parameters are the values for the linear portion of the model when the output gap is observed to 
be above the threshold, while for the MS model, the s₁ parameters are the values for the linear 
portion of the model when the unobserved state variable is in regime 1. Similarly, for the TR 
models, the BT parameters are the values for the linear portion of the model when the output gap 
is observed to be below the threshold, while for the MS model, the s₂ parameters are the values 
for the linear portion of the model when the unobserved state variable is in regime 2. 
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 Complete tables with all the constant terms can be obtained upon request. 
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The second column presents the results of the basic regression model given by (3.1), 
which was run using OLS. This model has no threshold, so the first row is left blank as are many 
of the later rows which correspond to parameters from alternative models. The remaining 
columns of the tables present various nonlinear models in which the dependent variable is a 
nonlinear function of the various economic variables.
33
 
Column 3 presents the estimates for the TR model which uses the lagged output gap as 
the threshold variable and is analogous to the Balassone et al. (2010) model in that the threshold 
value is arbitrarily set to 0, hence the TR-0 notation. The fourth column presents the estimates 
for a TR model in which the threshold is endogenously chosen so as to obtain the best fit. We 
distinguish it by using the TR-E notation. The fifth column shows the parameter estimates for the 
two-state MS formulation. Finally, toward the bottom of the tables are various measures of fit, 
which are used for comparison purposes with the alternative models.  
First we focus on Table 3.1 which shows the results for the various empirical models 
where the dependent variable is the tax revenues. LM model finds that the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable is somewhat less than 1 and is highly significant, showing evidence of 
a highly persistent fiscal rule. The lagged debt coefficient is positive and insignificant and the 
lagged output gap coefficient is positive and significant. Even though it is insignificant, the 
positive sign on the lagged debt coefficient is useful to note because, as emphasized by Cassou et 
al. (2015), Collignon (2012) , and others, a positive value for the lagged debt coefficient in tax 
revenues regression can be viewed as being consistent with a sustainable fiscal policy. In 
particular, high values of debt imply higher tax revenues values, which result in a decrease in the 
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 It is useful to emphasize that although the TR models are linear in the interaction terms denoted in equation (3.2), 
they are nonlinear in the economic variables. 
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debt level the following period. Next note that the positive coefficient on the lagged output gap 
indicates that the reactions of tax revenues to economic conditions are countercyclical. 
Looking down column 3 of Table 3.1, we see that when the economy was both above and 
below potential output in the previous period (i.e. both above and below the threshold value of 
zero), the lagged tax revenues coefficients are highly significant and close to one. We also see 
that the lagged debt coefficient is positive and insignificant when the lagged output gap was 
above potential and negative and insignificant when the economy was below potential. 
Furthermore, the lagged output gap coefficients are negative when the economy was above and 
positive when the economy was below potential in the previous period, but only the below 
potential coefficient is significant. 
The coefficients on the lagged debt and output gap variables provide insight into how 
fiscal policy makers behave. In particular, the positive lagged debt coefficient during above 
threshold values implies that tax revenues increase in response to an increase in debt to GDP 
ratio when the economy is doing well, while the negative lagged debt coefficient during below 
threshold values could be interpreted as showing that policy makers are more concerned with 
getting the economy back on track and therefore they cut taxes in favor of trying to revive the 
economy. To some extent, this interpretation is consistent with ideas developed in Cassou et al. 
(2015), where they noted that during times of distress policy makers temporarily forgo fiscal 
policy sustainability (i.e. a long-term goal) in favor of trying to revive the economy back to a 
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situation with higher-than-average output growth rates (i.e. a short-term priority), at which time 
they then follow a sustainable fiscal policy program.
34
 
A similar asymmetric contingent interpretation can be made for the lagged output gap 
coefficients. In particular, the larger (in absolute value) and significant coefficient during the 
below threshold case shows that policy makers are more focused on getting the economy on 
track during downturns by cutting taxes more severely than good times, where the coefficient is 
somewhat smaller (in absolute value) and is insignificant. This interpretation is consistent with 
the asymmetric fiscal policy result found in Balassone et al. (2010) for a sample of fourteen 
European Union countries, and found in Cassou et al. (2015) for U.S. economy.
35
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 Their result shows during economics good times (above threshold) primary balance (government primary 
expenditure - government tax revenues) declines in response to an increase in debt to GDP ratio while during 
economic bad times (below threshold) primary balance increases in response to an increase in debt to GDP ratio. 
35
 Balassone et al. (2010) and Cassou et al. (2014) both show a strong countercyclical response when economic 
conditions are poor. 
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Table 3.1: Federal Government Tax Revenues (1955:1 - 2013:3) 
 LM TR-0 TR-E MS 
Threshold  0 -1.957  
Lagged Tax Revenues 0.902**    
 (0.027)    
Lagged Debt 0.001    
 (0.002)    
Lagged Output Gap 0.036**    
 (0.012)    
Lagged Tax Revenues - AT or s₁  0.938** 0.935** 0.993** 
  (0.041) (0.030) (0.030) 
Lagged Tax Revenues - BT or s₂  0.825** 0.621** 0.733** 
  (0.042) (0.070) (0.096) 
Lagged Debt - AT or s₁  0.0008 0.002 0.0005 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Lagged Debt - BT or s₂  -0.001 -0.015** 0.0012 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) 
Lagged Output Gap - AT or s₁  -0.006 0.015 0.016 
  (0.033) (0.020) (0.014) 
Lagged Output Gap - BT or s₂  0.072** 0.067 0.072 
  (0.025) (0.051) (0.051) 
1st-regime volatility σ(s₁)    0.137** 
    (0.021) 
2nd-regime volatility σ(s₂)    0.752** 
    (0.094) 
p₁₁     0.975** 
    (0.008) 
p₂₂     0.843** 
    (0.024) 
RSS 45.958 44.38 41.607  
AIC 907.518 907.307 892.142  
SBC 921.356 934.984 919.819  
log-likelihood    -23.355 
Null 1: F-Stat  2.018 5.935**  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, 
while two asterisks indicate significant at the 5% level. AT and BT stand for above threshold 
and below threshold respectively. 
 
The various fit parameters toward the bottom of the table show that the TR-0 model fits 
better than the simple LM model and the null hypothesis that there is no improvement in the fit, 
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as indicated by the row labeled F-Stat, shows an F-statistic of 2.018, which is less than the 5% 
critical value of 2.371, and thus cannot be rejected. 
The fourth column of Table 3.1 shows that the best fitting threshold for this model occurs 
at a lagged output gap value of -1.957 which is somewhat lower than the zero threshold used in 
the TR-0 model. The parameter estimates for this model are largely the same as those for the 
zero threshold model and can be interpreted as showing the same asymmetric behavior for 
government tax revenues. In particular, the lagged debt coefficients provide some evidence that 
tax revenues increase in response to an increase in debt to GDP ratio in good times, but show 
that tax revenues significantly decrease during bad times. This result is similar to the 
interpretation provided in Cassou et al. (2015) that concerns toward improving the economy 
overwhelm sustainability concerns in bad times. Similarly, the positive coefficients on the lagged 
output gap for both above and below the threshold values show that tax revenues react in a 
countercyclical fashion. Furthermore, these reactions are asymmetric in that there is a greater 
level of intervention during economic downturns. However, we should qualify this conclusion by 
noting that the insignificant value for both output gap coefficients does weaken this 
interpretation. Finally, looking at the various measures of fit at the bottom of the fourth column 
we see that the endogenous threshold TR model fits somewhat better than the zero threshold TR 
model. The test that this model fits no better than the LM model, has an F-statistic of 5.935, 
which is larger than the 5% critical value of 4.1174, and thus is easily rejected.
36
 
The fifth column of Table 3.1 shows the parameter estimates for the two-state MS model 
when dependent variable is the tax revenues. Before describing the estimation results, it is useful 
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 The critical value of 4.122 does not come from a conventional F distribution table.  We computed this number by 
using a bootstrap simulation procedure described in Hansen (1997) which showed that the F-statistic in TR models 
do not have F distributions and that proper critical values can be found using a bootstrap procedure. 
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to study Figure 3.1 in order to understand how to interpret the two-state conditions. Figure 3.1 
shows the smoothed state 1 probability for the MS model.
37
 
 
Figure 3.1: Two-State MS Model (Tax Revenues) 
 
Focusing on the boom economic period of the 1990s, one can see that the probability of 
being in state 1 is very high. Similarly, during the boom period of the mid 2000s, Figure 3.1  
shows a high probability of being in state 1. These high probabilities for state 1 during good 
economic times show that we can say that state 1 is generally associated with good economic 
times and correspondingly, state 2 is generally associated with poor economic times. Moreover, 
state 1 is also strongly associated with the Great Moderation period, which is characterized by 
low volatility.
38
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 The smoothed probabilities are computed using the information over the whole sample of size T (i.e., 
prob[s_{t}=1|I_{T}]) as discussed in Hamilton (1994, p. 694). Moreover, Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 below show the 
smoothed probabilities along with various business cycle turning points which have been dated by the NBER. 
38
 The precise dating for the Great Moderation is the subject of debate, but many studies, such as Stock and Watson 
(2002), have suggested this low volatility period starts around 1984.  Furthermore, although the debate is still open, 
the end of this low volatility period likely ended with the financial crisis in late 2007. 
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Now focusing on the parameter estimates we see that the lagged balance coefficients are 
near 1 and significant in both states. The response to lagged debt shows positive and insignificant 
coefficients for both states, with the responses during bad times or state 2 being a bit larger. The 
response of tax revenues to the lagged output gap is positive for both states which shows 
countercyclical behavior with the higher value for state 2 compare to state 1 which implies 
stronger responses in economic bad times and therefore shows asymmetric reactions to the 
lagged output gap. However, the insignificant values for both coefficients weaken this 
interpretation. Moreover, the volatility of innovations in state 1, σ(s₁), is roughly five times 
lower than the volatility of innovations in state 2, σ(s₂). It is important to keep in mind this 
changing volatility feature uncovered by the MS formulation when comparing the estimation 
results obtained from the two approaches because the TR formulation assumes, in contrast to the 
MS formulation, an identical level of innovation volatility both above and below the threshold 
level. 
Finally let us comment a bit on the parameters for the transition probabilities. Focusing 
on the MS model, we see that probability of staying in state 1 if one begins in state 1, p₁₁, is very 
high at 0.975, while the probability of staying in state 2 if one begins in state 2, p₂₂, is smaller at 
0.843. These estimates show that there is high persistence for both states, with the persistence 
during good times being larger.  
Next we focused on Table 3.2 which shows the results for the various empirical models 
where the dependent variable is the government primary expenditure. The LM finds the lagged 
dependent variable is close to 1 and is highly significant, showing evidence of a highly persistent 
expenditure, the lagged debt coefficient is negative and insignificant. Although it is insignificant, 
the negative value for the lagged debt coefficient in primary expenditure regression can be 
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viewed as being consistent with a sustainable fiscal policy, as emphasized by Cassou et al. 
(2015). In particular, high values of debt imply lower primary expenditure values, which result in 
a decrease in the debt level the following period. The lagged output gap coefficient is negative 
and significant implying that the behavior of primary expenditure is countercyclical. 
Column 3 of Table 3.2 also shows that when the economy was both above and below 
potential output in the previous period, the lagged primary expenditure coefficients are highly 
significant and close to one. The lagged debt coefficient is negative and insignificant when the 
economy was above potential and positive and insignificant when the economy was below 
potential. Furthermore, the lagged output gap coefficients are negative when the economy was 
both above and below potential in the previous period, but only the below potential coefficient is 
significant.  
To be more precise, the negative lagged debt coefficient during above threshold values 
implies that policy makers decline government expenditure in response to an increase in debt to 
GDP ratio when the economy is doing well, while the positive lagged debt coefficient during 
below threshold values could be interpreted as showing that policy makers are more concerned 
with getting the economy back on track and therefore they increase government expenditure in 
favor of trying to revive the economy. This interpretation is also consistent with the ideas 
developed in Cassou et al. (2015). 
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Table 3.2: Federal Government Primary Expenditure (1955:1 - 2013:3) 
 LM TR-0 TR-E MS 
Threshold  0 1.163  
Lagged Primary Expenditure 0.950**    
 (0.015)    
Lagged Debt -0.001    
 (0.001)    
Lagged Output Gap -0.062**    
 (0.010)    
Lagged Primary Expenditure - AT or s₁  0.928** 0.873** 0.972** 
  (0.027) (0.040) (0.018) 
Lagged Primary Expenditure - BT or s₂  0.950** 0.947** 0.948** 
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.028) 
Lagged Debt - AT or s₁  -0.003 -0.012** -0.0055 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
Lagged Debt - BT or s₂  0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.017) (0.003) 
Lagged Output Gap - AT or s₁  -0.032 -0.037 -0.113** 
  (0.027) (0.036) (0.014) 
Lagged Output Gap - BT or s₂  -0.090** -0.085** -0.028* 
  (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) 
1st-regime volatility σ(s₁)    0.094** 
    (0.011) 
2nd-regime volatility σ(s₂)    0.439** 
    (0.048) 
p₁₁    0.977** 
    (0.016) 
p₂₂    0.874** 
    (0.026) 
RSS 27.043 26.219 25.656  
AIC 782.896 783.622 778.523  
SBC 796.735 811.299 806.199  
log-likelihood    0.024 
Null 1: F-Stat  1.784 3.068  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, while two 
asterisks indicate significant at the 5% level. AT and BT stand for above threshold and below 
threshold respectively. 
 
A similar asymmetric interpretation can be made for the lagged output gap coefficients. 
In particular, the larger (in absolute value) and significant coefficient during the below threshold 
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case shows that policy makers are more focused on getting the economy on track during 
downturns by increasing primary expenditure more severely in bad times. However, during good 
times, they mute the economic booms slowly by decreasing primary expenditure where the 
coefficient is somewhat smaller (in absolute value) and is insignificant. This interpretation is also 
consistent with the asymmetric fiscal policy result found in Balassone et al. (2010) and Cassou et 
al. (2015). The various fit parameters toward the bottom of the table show that the TR-0 model 
fits better than the simple LM model and the null hypothesis that there is no improvement in the 
fit, shows an F-statistic of 1.784, which is less than the 5% critical value of 2.371, and thus 
cannot be rejected. 
The fourth column of Table 3.2 shows that the best fitting endogenous threshold model is 
achieved at the lagged output gap value of 1.163 which is somewhat higher than the zero 
threshold used in the TR-0 model. The parameter estimates for this model are largely the same as 
those for the zero threshold model and can be interpreted as showing the same asymmetric and 
countercyclical behavior for government primary expenditure. In particular, the lagged debt 
coefficients provide some strong evidence that policy makers decline primary expenditure in 
response to an increase in debt to GDP ratio in good times, but show that during bad times they 
increase primary expenditure in order to revive the economy which is similar to the interpretation 
provided in Cassou et al. (2015). Coefficients for lagged output gap also provide evidence of 
countercyclical reactions of primary expenditure to the economy. Furthermore, these reactions 
are asymmetric in that there is a greater level of intervention during economic downturns. 
Finally, looking at the various measures of fit at the bottom of the fourth column we see that the 
endogenous threshold TR model fits somewhat better than the zero threshold TR model. The test 
that this model fits no better than the LM model, as indicated by the row labeled F-Stat, has an F-
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statistic of 3.068, which is not larger than the 5% critical value of 4.1168, and thus cannot be 
rejected. 
Before describing the estimation results for two-state MS model, it is useful to study 
Figure 3.2 in order to understand how to interpret the two-state conditions. Unlike the model for 
tax revenues where State 1 is generally lined up with the boom periods and state 2 is generally 
lined up with recessions, Figure 3.2 does not clearly determine which states is associated with 
good times and which one is associated with bad times. In particular, looking at Figure 3.2, we 
see that the probability of being in state 2, not only is high in recession periods, but also is high 
in some of the boom periods. In fact one of the characteristics of MS model is that the state 
variable, unlike TR models, is unobservable. Therefore, MS model assigns the observations to 
each state in a way that obtains the best fit, not necessarily in a way that clearly separates 
economic good times from economic bad times like what we observed in TR models. Therefore, 
the interpretations for these coefficients are not quite the same as described for the TR models. 
However, looking at Figure 3.2 more carefully, we see that state 2 is largely associated with the 
periods prior to 1980s, late 1990s, late 2000s, and early 2010s which are generally lined up with 
the periods when democratic parties dominated the political scene, while state 1 is largely lined 
up with the periods when conservative parties were dominating. 
Now focusing on the parameter estimates we see that the lagged dependent variable 
coefficients are near 1 and significant in both states. The response to lagged debt is asymmetric, 
showing a negative and insignificant coefficient during state 1, but a positive and insignificant 
coefficient during state 2. The response to the lagged output gap is negative in both states, it is 
highly significant in state 1, but marginally significant in state 2. Moreover, the volatility of 
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innovations in state 1, σ(s₁), is roughly four times lower than the volatility of innovations in state 
2, σ(s₂). 
 
Figure 3.2: Two-State MS Model (Primary Expenditure) 
 
Since state 1 is generally associated with the Republican dominating periods and state 2 
is roughly associated with the Democratic dominating periods, one interpretation for the 
parameters estimate is that government expenditure tends to decrease in response to an increase 
in debt to GDP ratio in state 1, while it is likely to increase in state 2. Furthermore, the negative 
and significant response to lagged output gap for both states with the larger value (in absolute 
value) in state 1 implies the higher level of intervention in state 1. 
Finally, it is useful to recall that our main purpose is to investigate the asymmetry in 
reaction of each budget component to debt level and economic conditions over the cycle. 
Therefore, according to the results for expenditure regression, MS model is not as useful as it 
was for tax revenue regression since it cannot clearly separate economic good times from bad 
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times. Hence, one can conclude that when dependent variable is government expenditure, TR 
models provide a better interpretation for our goal than MS model. 
Let us conclude this section with a brief summary of the key findings. In general, we 
found that there was a sequence of improvements in the fit and performance of the models 
presented. While the linear model exhibited desirable properties, such as debt sustainability and 
countercyclical behavior, it did not fit as well as the TR models and the MS models which 
allowed asymmetric behavior on the part of policy makers. However the TR and MS models 
showed their own weaknesses. For instance, they did not show debt sustainability during weak 
economic times. This behavior is interpreted as reasonable as it shows that during weak 
economic times policy makers are more concerned with getting the economy back on track. 
Furthermore, while the MS model for tax revenues showed somewhat symmetric and 
countercyclical responses to lagged debt and lagged output gap in both regimes, the MS model 
for government expenditure showed asymmetric responses to lagged debt and lagged output gap. 
However, it is useful to note that the interpretation of two regimes were not completely 
consistent in these to estimations. In particular, in MS model for tax revenues state 1 was 
generally associated with economic good times and state 2 was associated with bad time. This 
interpretation was in line with the purpose of this paper as it allowed us to study the reactions of 
tax revenues to different variables depending on the strength of economy. However, the MS 
model for government expenditure did not necessarily assign the observation into each state in a 
way which aligns with our purpose. Therefore, one can conclude that the TR models are the best 
way to model the reactions of government expenditure. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This paper extends the analysis in Cassou et al. (2015) to investigate whether the two 
major components of the U.S. fiscal budget exhibit asymmetric behavior in their reaction to debt 
levels and economic conditions over the business cycle. These budget components include tax 
revenues and the primary expenditure. 
Both budget components exhibit these asymmetries, but the asymmetries for tax revenues 
show greater statistical significance. In addition, these results are somewhat weaker than those in 
Cassou et al. (2015).  In particular, we find coefficient values that show asymmetries, but these 
coefficients are often statistically insignificant.  The response of tax revenues to debt levels 
during good economic times are positive showing a policy concern for the high debt, but during 
poor times are negative showing a stronger policy concern for getting the economy back on 
track. Similar results, yet opposite in sign, are found for expenditures. Regarding fiscal policy 
sustainability, these findings show sustainability only during good times. 
Regarding the cyclicality of the reactions, our analysis found robust evidence that both 
budget components are countercyclical to economic condition. Moreover, most of the models 
show that these countercyclical reactions are asymmetric over the business cycle in that there is a 
greater level of intervention during economic downturns. 
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Appendix A. Full Version of Table 1.2 
Table A.1: Variations on the Second Interval Sample Period 
 
